Rice Price Stabilization in Madagascar: Price and Welfare Implications of Variable Tariffs by Dorosh, Paul A. & Minten, Bart
 
 
Rice Price Stabilization in Madagascar: 




















Poster paper prepared for presentation at the  
International Association 
of Agricultural Economists Conference,  





Copyright 2006 by Paul A. Dorosh and Bart Minten. All rights reserved. Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purpose by any means, 






Rice Price Stabilization in Madagascar: 
 



















                                                 
*  Senior Rural Development Economist, World Bank (pdorosh@worldbank.org). 
** Cornell University Food and Nutrition Policy Program.   
 
1 We wish to thank Benu Bidani, Marie-Hélène Dabat, Olivier Jenn-treyer, John Magnay and Ziva 
Razafintsalama for sharing their insights on rice markets and policy in Madagascar.  The views expressed 
in this paper are solely those of the authors and are not meant to represent the views of their respective 
institutions.         
2 
Rice Price Stabilization in Madagascar: 
Price and Welfare Implications of Variable Tariffs 
Paul Dorosh and Bart Minten 
1. Introduction 
  International trade, especially private sector international trade, has long been 
recognized by economists as an efficient means of stabilizing domestic food prices.  
Trade flows add to domestic supplies in times of shortage (or provide an additional 
market in times of surplus), with adjustments in trade taxes providing a mechanism to 
influence both traded quantities and domestic prices.
2  The main alternative intervention, 
publicly held stocks, has generally proved to be highly inefficient, both because of high 
costs involved in government procurement, storage and disposal (distribution) of food, as 
well as disincentives for development of more efficient private markets.  Nonetheless, 
governments in developing countries continue to intervene in food markets, in large part 
because of the political sensitivity of food prices in urban markets, notwithstanding 
pressures for liberalization of markets and reductions in fiscal subsidies on the part of 
donors (Islam and Thomas, 1996).  
To a large extent, Madagascar has opted for a policy of market stabilization 
through private sector trade for its major food staple, rice, since a period of structural 
adjustment in the late 1980s.
3  Private sector imports, averaging about 5 percent of total 
supply, have occurred almost every year, stabilizing rice prices in the months prior to the 
major rice harvest (Figure 1).  Although structural adjustment policies in sub-Saharan 
                                                 
2 See Timmer (1989) for a discussion of the analytics of trade policy to stabilize food markets.  For an 
example of how private trade with India has stabilized rice prices in Bangladesh, see Dorosh (2001).   
3 The rice subsidy reached 25% of the government budget in the mid-1980s prior to market reforms 
(Dorosh and Bernier, 1994).          
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Africa have often led to increased price variability, the private sector rice import trade 
generally has kept rice prices in Madagascar more stable than prices of major staples in 
other African countries, such as Ethiopia and Zambia (Table 1).   
However, in 2004, following a surge in rice prices brought about by a domestic 
production shortfall that coincided with a large depreciation of the Malagasy franc 
(FMG) and a rise in world rice prices, government interventions actually discouraged 
private sector imports through uncertainties regarding possible reductions in import 
tariffs.  Instead of reducing rice import tariffs, a policy of subsidized sales of rice at an 
official price below import parity (including tariffs) was adopted.   
In the Madagascar context, adjustments in the import tariff for rice are 
problematic for several reasons.  First, adjustments in rice tariffs can entail a significant 
loss of fiscal revenues.  Second, unless tariff adjustments are done in a transparent 
manner, the uncertainty surrounding possible impending tariff adjustments could reduce 
private sector incentives for imports.   Third, although most Malagasy are net rice 
consumers, reductions in tariffs can reduce incomes of domestic producers.
4     
This paper explores these issues and analyzes the relative merits of adjustments in 
the import tariffs to the main alternative for rice price stabilization: subsidized sales of 
government rice to target groups.  To do so, we use data from the national household 
survey and a partial equilibrium model of Madagascar’s rice economy to simulate the 
effects of these policy options on the population as a whole and on the poor in particular.  
  
                                                 
4 A fourth issue is that tariff reductions for rice could result in major political pressures to reduce tariffs for 
other consumer items, resulting not only in a distorted and complex trade regime, but further reducing tariff 
revenues, and perhaps leading to a surge in imports and a balance of payments crisis.  This aspect, is, 
however, beyond the scope of this paper.      
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2. Analytical framework 
The effects of tariff changes on domestic rice prices, rice demand, domestic 
production and import levels can be estimated using a simple analytical framework as 
described below. Domestic rice prices in Madagascar have generally tracked the import 
parity price of rice, indicating that these two broad types of rice are very close substitutes 
in demand for Malagasy consumers (refer to Figure 1).  Thus, the analysis assumes that, 
as long as Madagascar is a net rice importer, domestic prices are equal to the import 
parity price of rice, i.e. the US$ cost and freight price of rice times the FMG/$ exchange 
rate, and adjusted for import tariffs (including the TVA) and marketing costs (transport, 
handling, storage, etc.) to domestic rice markets.    
Under these assumptions, any change in world prices, exchange rates or tariffs 
will result in a corresponding change in the import parity and domestic prices of rice.  
Given these exogenous price changes, new levels of domestic demand and production 
can be calculated using assumed price elasticities of demand and supply.  Effects of these 
price changes on various household groups are estimated using data from the national 
household survey on household rice consumption and production.  Sensitivity analysis is 
done using alternative estimates for these key parameters. 
The model implicitly assumes an integrated market across regions of Madagascar, 
i.e. prices throughout the country are assumed to be driven by the import parity price. 
Even though imported rice is found in many rural markets in Madagascar, there remain 
large areas in which rice markets are effectively isolated from the national rice market 
throughout the year due to high transactions costs (Moser et al., 2005).  In the absence of 
effective price transmission from import parity to local rice prices, household demand      
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and supply will not respond to changes in the import parity price.  Because of this, the 
model will tend to overstate the overall price responsiveness of domestic demand and 
supply.  For this reason, the elasticities of supply and demand used in this analysis are 
deliberately chosen to be low. 
This annual model further does not take into account the often significant 
seasonality of rice prices in Madagascar (Barrett, 1996).  The implicit assumption in the 
model is that seasonal price fluctuations remain unchanged (in percentage terms) when 
average annual prices change.  Thus, in each simulation, producer prices in the immediate 
post-harvest season rise by the same percentage (relative to the base) as consumer prices. 
Net supply of rice in Madagascar is calculated as the sum of net production and 
imports in the base year of 2001, the year of the national household survey. We use a 
production estimate of 1.787 mn tons of rice (equivalent to 2.978 mn tons of paddy 
multiplied by 0.61 to adjust for milling, seed, feed and wastage).  Assuming a level of 
imports of 200 thousand tons (and no change in stocks), net availability (consumption) is 
equal to 1.987 mn tons. 
 
3. Implications of changes in rice import tariffs 
Effects on rice imports and tariff revenues 
Table 2 presents simulation results of the effects of the elimination of the 10% 
tariff on rice imports. Since some of the marketing costs are assumed to be fixed in FMG 
terms, the percentage change in the domestic rice price is only 6.9%. Four scenarios 
illustrate the effect of the elimination under different assumptions of price responsiveness 
of consumers and producers in Madagascar. Under the assumption of no change in      
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quantities demanded or supplied (Simulation 1 with elasticities of supply and demand 
both equal to zero), the change in tariff rates results in a proportional decline in tariff 
revenues, which fall from $20.7 mn to only $13.8 mn (a 33 percent decline).   
If consumer demand falls with rising rice prices, the elimination of a tariff 
increases rice demand by 1.4 percent (with an elasticity of demand of -0.2, simulation 2) 
or 2.9 percent (with an elasticity of demand of -0.4, simulation 3).  To supply this 
demand (assuming production is fixed), imports also rise from 200 thousand tons in the 
base scenario to 229 and 258 thousand tons in simulations 2 and 3, respectively.  With 
greater import volume, tariff revenues decline less than in simulation 1 – by only $4.9 mn 
(24 percent) in simulation 2 and only $2.9 mn (14 percent) in simulation 3. 
If producers are also price-responsive, the 6.9 percent decrease in prices results in 
a 30 thousand ton decline in rice production (1.4 percent, assuming an elasticity of supply 
of 0.2, simulation 4). Combined with the effects of lower prices on consumer demand, 
this leads to an increase in imports to 283 thousand tons (13.8% of supply, compared to 
only 10.1% of supply in the base). Tariff revenues are $19.6 mn, only $1.1 mn (6 
percent) below the base levels.   
Thus, these simulations indicate that, taking into account price-responsiveness of 
supply and demand for rice in Madagascar, elimination of the 10% tariff on rice has little 
effect on overall tariff (plus TVA) revenues for rice imports, because the volume of rice 
imports increases as the tariff rate is reduced.   
Impacts on households 
Net buyers of rice make up a large part of the population in Madagascar, also in 
rural areas (Barrett and Dorosh, 1996; Minten and Zeller, 2000). Estimates based on      
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annual production and consumption data from the 2001 national household survey (the 
enquete permanent aupres des ménages, EPM 2001) indicate that 19% of the households 
in Madagascar are net sellers of rice, 11% are self-sufficient and 46% are net buyers 
(Table 3). 23% of the households are urban households and most of them can be 
considered net buyers. Almost 60% of the purchased rice in Madagascar is estimated to 
be consumed by the net buyers in rural areas. 
The effects of changes in rice tariffs and rice prices on household rice 
consumption and welfare depend to a large extent on whether the household is a net 
producer or consumer of rice.  Most households in Madagascar grow some rice (even 
urban households), so the beneficial effects of a decrease in rice prices for consumers is 
not as large as it would be if most households purchased all their rice.  For the poorest 60 
percent of households in Madagascar, the ratio of production to total consumption is 
98%; for the urban poor, this ratio is 74% (Table 3).  Even for rural rice deficit 
households, own production is equal to 50% of rice consumption.  Moreover, there are 
significant numbers of almost self-sufficient  poor households (1.36 million people in 269 
thousand households, EPM 2001 data) that suffer net welfare losses when rice prices rise.    
Eliminating the 10% rice tariff and thus reducing the domestic rice price by 6.9% 
results in net benefits to the rural poor net buyers and the urban poor by a total of $8.5-
8.8 mn (Table 4), with the estimated benefit increasing as the price responsiveness of 
supply and demand increase.  However, rural poor surplus producers suffer a welfare loss 
of $6.9 to 7.2 mn because of the lower rice price.  Thus, the net benefits to all poor 
(including also the rural self-sufficient households) are only $0.6 to $1.3 mn.        
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In a year of high import parity prices of rice that raises domestic prices, producers 
of rice gain relative to normal price years, even with a decline in the rice tariff.  Reducing 
the rice tariff simply mitigates the welfare loss of high rice prices to net consumers (and 
reduces the windfall gains to net rice producers).  In these simulations, the government 
forgoes $1.1 mn (Simulation 4 with high price responsiveness) to $6.9 mn (Simulation 1 
with no price responsiveness) in revenues in order to transfer benefits of $8.5 to $8.8 mn 
to poor net consumers.  The ratio of benefits to poor net rice consumers to lost tariff 
revenues is 1.2 to 7.7, with the most plausible estimates ranging from 1.8 to 7.7 
(simulations 2 through 4). 
In theory, a targeted direct cash transfer of $8.5 to $8.8 mn (or targeted subsidized 
sales of rice of the same value) could avoid the welfare losses for net producers, while 
providing the same benefits to net consumers as a rice price reduction.  Administrative 
costs of targeting and distribution, as well as the likelihood of leakages, would raise the 
costs of such a program beyond the $8.5 to $8.8 million in benefits calculated here.   
 It is also important to note that reductions in rice tariffs have substantial benefits 
for non-poor net rice consumers, as well as costs for non-poor net rice producers.  Most 
of these non-poor households are net rice consumers; including these households into the 
estimated benefits to net rice consumers raises total estimated benefits substantially, i.e. 
ranging between $27.1 mn and $28.0 mn (compared with $8.5 mn to $8.8 mn considering 
only poor net consumers).  Thus, the most plausible estimates of the ratio of benefits to 
net consumers relative to lost tariff revenues rises overall to a range of 5.6 to 24.5.  Net 
gains to all households also rise to a range of $7.2 mn to $8.7 mn (compared to only $0.6 
mn to $1.3 mn considering only poor households).  These net benefits to the non-poor      
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come at no additional cost to the government (in terms of additional lost tariff revenues), 
but are not necessarily the major objective of the price stabilization through tariff 
reduction policy.   
 
4. Medium-term rice price stabilization options 
  One option to stabilize prices in Madagascar would be to rely on international 
trade and periodic tariff adjustments to set the ceiling price of rice. This policy would 
involve no government or publicly managed stocks, no restrictions on private market 
imports (apart from tariffs), and import tariff adjustments to be set each year at time of 
major harvest (March/April) and fixed for one year.  These import tariffs could be set at a 
price to maintain private sector incentives for imports at expected world prices.  The key 
to this price stabilization through private imports policy, however, would be transparency 
and a level playing field, i.e. a common set of tariffs, rules and information for all market 
participants.   
The above analysis suggests that reductions in rice import tariffs in years with 
high import parity prices can effectively mitigate the adverse effects of sharp increases in 
prices on poor consumers in Madagascar.  In years when world prices and exchange rates 
have not risen substantially relative to the previous year, no tariff adjustments would be 
needed to maintain a substantial degree of price stability. 
In case of local production shortfalls coinciding with very high import parity 
prices, the government might want to intervene. It would, however, have to tender for 
commercial imports in a transparent and equitable manner and sell at loss if it wanted to      
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reduce market prices.  Donor food aid stocks could also provide a small emergency stock 
for targeted safety net distribution. 
  A second broad policy option would involve a rice security stock, not necessarily 
managed by the government, but under government control. To avoid disincentives to 
local producers, the sales/release price should be announced prior to the main planting 
season and held fixed for one year. And to avoid disincentives for private sector imports, 
the sales/release price should be higher than the expected import parity price. Stocks 
could be rotated through government sales at import parity (including tax) and 
government tenders for commercial imports. 
Such a policy of government stocks and domestic market interventions risks 
substantial fiscal losses, corruption, and private market disincentives if government 
expands stocks, the policy is not transparent, or the government intervenes heavily in 
local markets. Unfortunately, this has been the usual experience in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and elsewhere (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988). Given the small size of typical rice market 
shortfalls, very rough initial calculations suggest that costs of even relatively small stocks 
in Madagascar may not outweigh advantages. Assuming a stock of 60,000 tons with 
$30/ton annual storage costs, the total annual costs would be $1.8 mn.  Major production 
shortfalls in Madagascar occur about one in four years. Average costs (including costs of 
stock rotation, etc.) per major production shortfall may thus amount to almost $8 million.   
Under either of these options, flexibility in adjusting the import tariff, once per 
year, in line with expectations of the world price of rice would be needed.  This differs 
from a variable tariff policy in that it is more transparent and less complicated –      
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important considerations in Madagascar’s current atmosphere of mistrust between 
government and many private sector traders. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
  Since Madagascar is a net rice importing country, and since domestic and local 
rice are very good substitutes, changes in the cost of imported rice in domestic markets 
(the import parity price) to a large extent determine the price of local rice.  In this 
situation, as long as incentives for competitive private sector trade are maintained, this 
import parity price provides a price ceiling for domestic prices in the country, and 
transparent and pre-announced tariff reductions can be used to mitigate the effects of 
increases in the price of imported rice on poor consumers.   
Estimates presented in this paper suggest that these tariff adjustments result in 
small losses of tariff revenues (since reductions in tariff rates also increase the quantity of 
imports) with benefits to poor net rice consumers estimated to be between 2.0 to 8.7 
times the value of lost tariff revenues. Moreover, these benefits are achieved without the 
high administrative costs of a direct food transfer program or maintenance of government 
stocks.   
Finally, the experience of Madagascar as described in this paper illustrates the 
importance of maintaining private sector incentives if trade flows are to act as an 
effective price stabilization mechanism.  Transparency of government policy is thus 
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Table 1: Monthly staple price variability in some selected developing countries ($/ton)   
 
Bangladesh India Zambia Ethiopia Madagascar Madagascar
National Ave. Delhi Lusaka Addis Antananarivo Antananarivo
Wholesale Wholesale Retail Retail Retail Retail
Coarse Rice Coarse Rice White Maize Maize Rice Rice
$/ton $/ton $/ton $/ton $/ton $/ton
Period 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 2003-2004
Average Price 240.9 218.7 191.8 127.7 397.2 421.3
Standard Deviation 32.0 23.0 59.4 39.6 49.4 59.7
Coef. of Variation 0.133 0.105 0.310 0.310 0.015 0.02
Maximum 307.1 266.0 352.1 225.7 538.8 572.8
Minimum 193.5 184.0 100.9 55.7 313.3 279.3
Max/Min 1.59 1.45 3.49 4.05 1.71 2.05
Max/Mean 1.27 1.22 1.84 1.77 1.36 1.36
Source: Authors' calculations.     
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Table 2: Effects of Tariff Changes on Imports and Tariff Revenues  
 
  Base  Simulation 1  Simulation 2  Simulation 3  Simulation 4 
           
Elasticities (demand,supply)    (0,0)  (-0.2,0)  (-0.4,0)  (-0.4,0.2) 
           
Production (paddy, mn tons)  2.978  2.978  2.978  2.978  2.936 
           
Rice Production (mn tons)  1.787  1.787  1.787  1.787  1.762 
Imports (mn tons)  0.200  0.200  0.229  0.258  0.283 
           
Total Supply (mn tons)  1.987  1.987  2.016  2.045  2.045 
           
Elasticity of demand  --   0.0  -0.2  -0.4  -0.4 
Elasticity of supply  --   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 
           
Import Tariff (percent)  10  0  0  0  0 
Price (= import parity) (FMG/kg)  5200  4841  4841  4841  4841 
           
% change demand  --   0.0%  1.4%  2.9%  2.9% 
% change price  --   -6.9%  -6.9%  -6.9%  -6.9% 
Change in imports (mn tons)  --                 -                 0.03            0.06          0.08  
% change in imports  --   0%  14%  29%  42% 
Implicit import elasticity  --   0.0  -2.1  -4.2  -6.0 
           
Tariff revenues (bn FMG)  207  138  158  178  196 
Tariff revenues (mn $)  20.7  13.8  15.8  17.8  19.6 
Change in tariff revs (mn $)  --   -6.9  -4.9  -2.9  -1.1 
% reduction in tariff revs  --   -33%  -24%  -14%  -6% 
           
Imports/Supply  10.1%  10.1%  11.3%  12.6%  13.8% 
Value of Imports (mn $)  57.0  57.0  65.2  73.4  80.7 
Source: Model simulations. (Note that total tariffs on rice in the base case consist of a rice import 
tariff of 10% and a value added tax of 20 percent. The total tariff is equal to 36% of the cost and 
freight price of rice).      
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Table 3: Rice consumption and production according to household net rice sales groups, 2001       
                          
       Rural             
      Net buyers  Self-sufficient  Net sellers  Urban  Total  Rural 
Net 
buyers 
Total Population               
Total population  7.321  1.682  3.082  3.583  15.668  12.085  10.903 
Total # households  1.519  0.366  0.626  0.805  3.315  2.510  2.324 
Pop/HH    4.82  4.60  4.92  4.45  4.73  4.81  4.69 
% of total population  46.7%  10.7%  19.7%  22.9%  100.0%  77.1%  69.6% 
                 
Rice production (kgs/HH)  231  433  1,692  265  539            625              243  
Rice use (kgs/HH)  550  436  812  603  600  599             568  
Rice consumption (kgs/person)  114.1  94.8  165.0  135.5  126.9         124.4           121.5  
Rice consumption ('000 tons)  835  160  509  485  1,989  1,503          1,321  
% production / use  42%  99%  208%  44%  90%  104%  43% 
Poorest 60% of Population               
Total poor population  4.666  1.361  2.179  1.196  9.402  8.205  5.862 
Total # poor households  0.851  0.269  0.377  0.219  1.715  1.497  1.070 
Pop/HH    5.48  5.07  5.78  5.47  5.48  5.48  5.48 
% of Total Poor  49.6%  14.5%  23.2%  12.7%  100.0%  87.3%  62.4% 
% of Total Population  29.8%  8.7%  13.9%  7.6%  60.0%  52.4%  37.4% 
                 
Rice production (kgs/HH)  242  424  1,470  387  559            584              272  
Rice use (kgs/HH)  485  356  935  522  568            575              492  
Rice consumption (kgs/person)  88.4  70.3  161.8  95.5  103.7         104.9             89.9  
Rice consumption ('000 tons)  413  96  352  114  975  861             527  
% production / use  50%  119%  157%  74%  98%  102%  55% 
Source: Calculated from EPM 2001 data                  
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Table 4: Effects of Tariff Changes on Household Welfare
Base Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4
(kgs/cap.) (mn $) (mn $) (mn $) (mn $)
Import tariff (percent)  10 0 0 0 0
Elasticities (demand,supply) --   (0,0) (-0.2,0) (-0.4,0) (-0.4,0.2)
Poorest 60% of Households
  Rural Net Buyers 88 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7
  Rural Self-Sufficient 70 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
  Rural Surplus 162 -7.2 -7.2 -7.1 -6.9
  Urban 95 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
  Total 104 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.3
  Net Buyers* 90 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.8
  Change in tariff revs (mn $) --   -6.9 -4.9 -2.9 -1.1
  Net Benefit/Lost Tariff Revenue --   1.2 1.8 3.0 7.7
All Households 
  Rural Net Buyers 114 17.4 17.6 17.8 17.9
  Rural Self-Sufficient 95 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
  Rural Surplus 165 -19.8 -19.7 -19.5 -19.3
  Urban 135 9.8 9.9 10.0 10.1
  Total 127 7.2 7.8 8.3 8.7
  Net Buyers* 121 27.1 27.5 27.8 28.0
  Change in tariff revs (mn $) --   -6.9 -4.9 -2.9 -1.1
  Net Benefit/Lost Tariff Revenue --   3.9 5.6 9.6 24.5
*Rural net buyers and all urban households.
Source: Model simulations       
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